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Abstract 
Drawing on the theoretical perspective that political, and in particular electoral, institutions 
influence the incentives of policymakers, this study examines the extent to which variation in US 
state election law is associated with variation in redistributive policy expenditures. In this paper, 
I utilize time series data from the period 1976-2018 across the 50 states to attempt to empirically 
assess whether reforms that decrease the political leverage of economic elites or expand the 
electorate increase the redistributive orientation of the state government. Following those two 
potential mechanisms––an elite-centered and a mass-based approach––I develop several 
empirical models to examine the relationship between electoral rules (the stringency of campaign 
finance law and presence or absence of same-day registration and absentee voting) and the 
percentage of the state budget devoted to Public Welfare or cash assistance payments as 
determined by the U.S. Census Annual Survey of State Government Finances. I find evidence 
under model specifications that do not include time effects to suggest that more stringent 
campaign finance legislation and no-excuse absentee voting are associated with higher 
proportions of redistributive expenditures, and that this campaign finance effect is due to 
restrictions on individual, rather than PAC, contributions. I do not find evidence to support the 
hypothesis that more lenient registration dates or no-excuse absentee voting are associated with 
changes in the composition of the electorate overall. However, in no models with time effects are 




 As of the 2018 midterm elections, Oregon and Alabama allowed unlimited donations 
from individuals and Political Action Committees to candidates for state legislature, while 
requiring the disclosure of donors only for those contributing over $100. In Alabama, voting 
occurs in person, only on election day, and with a valid photo ID––unless a specific excuse is 
available for absentee voting––and registration must occur over two weeks prior to the election; 
in Oregon, registration must occur three weeks prior to an election, though individuals who 
interact with the DMV are automatically registered. In contrast, Arizona and Maine offer public 
financing to state legislative and gubernatorial candidates; require disclosure of donor identity 
for any donation above $50, and restrict contributions to candidates for all state office from both 
individuals and Political Action Committees (in all permutations, at maximum $5,100 over two 
years; at minimum, $800 over two years). In neither state is an excuse required to request an 
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absentee ballot, and in Maine, registration to vote can occur through a period of early voting or 
on election day, including for convicted felons, who do not lose the right to vote even when 
serving a sentence.  
 Does the difference in these institutions matter? Election law, and its ramifications for 
representation, has increasingly become a notable topic of national conversation in the United 
States over the past decade. For the most part, these discussions have been framed as a partisan 
struggle––suggestions that restrictive voter identification legislation, the paring down of voter 
rolls, and reductions in polling hours unfairly shaped political outcomes have driven pre- and 
post-election commentary from the 2016 Wisconsin presidential election to the 2018 Georgia 
gubernatorial race. Even within parties, though, allegations of “dark money” funneled into 
candidacies or pledges to run campaigns that are “100 percent grassroots funded” have served as 
measures of purity towards a particular ideal of political representation. While these 
conversations are not explicitly policy oriented, the suggestion that “billionaires in wine caves” 
might choose the next president (to select a recent example from the 2020 Democratic Primary) 
is not only an accusation about the fairness of the fundraising process. Rather, it implies that 
“they” (the billionaires) may have a different set of policy aims than “us” (the average 
Americans), and that candidates who accept those large donations and increased contact time 
may be beholden to promises made over a glass of cabernet sauvignon. Taken together, these 
lines of thinking suggest that who votes and who funds has an impact on the process of policy 
formation in American politics.  
The political salience of these conversations is driven in part by a startling growth in 
income and wealth inequality experienced in the United States over the course of the past fifty 
years. As dramatized as political pronouncements may make this issue seem, there is substantial 
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evidence to document this trend. The income share of the highest earners has increased to 
Gatsby-era levels, while employment and wage growth has been experienced predominantly by 
the highest- and lowest-skilled workers, with decreasing employment opportunities and 
stagnating wages for mid-skilled jobs (see figures in appendix, drawn from Saez and Zucman 
(2016) and Autor and Dorn (2013)). Given the changes in the relative economic power of these 
groups of citizens, a natural inclination is to examine how that power might be exerted. That is, 
where do the political––and policy––preferences of these citizens diverge? And politically, are 
there factors that influence the extent to which those different preferences lead to different 
outcomes? 
Consequently, this honors thesis asks: What is the impact of variation in electoral 
institutions on the redistributive expenditures and policies of US states? The quantitative study of 
political institutions has solid precedent, from cross-national studies about legislative structure to 
subnational studies of the criminal justice system. And, as should be expected, electoral 
institutions have been a key focus in the political science literature. In that vein, the general 
theoretical perspective of this study is that institutional variation has the potential to influence the 
actions of citizens and politicians in such a way that the policy of a state takes a different course 
than it would have under a different set of institutions and rules. Election rules, in particular, 
have the potential to sway who holds the keys to power in democratic societies. In the United 
States, especially given recent focus on increasing inequality, these rules have received 
newfound scrutiny as moderators of “the will of the people.” Redistributive expenditures are an 
area of policy in which higher and lower income groups have both different “objective” interests 
and different expressed policy preferences. In particular, expenditures serve as an interesting 
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dependent variable because they are a more proximate outcome of the policy-making process 
than, say, actual levels of inequality.   
The ability of US states to independently develop the rules that govern state elections 
offers an opportunity to assess the impact of their variation. In order to investigate this question, 
I take a quantitative, time-series approach using both publicly available and original datasets to 
compare variation in electoral institutions and redistributive expenditures. I analyze two different 
types of electoral institutions based on two different lines of theory as described in Gilens and 
Page (2014): one that follows a tradition of economic elite domination (campaign finance 
legislation targeted to restrict disproportionate influence), and the other more in line with a 
majoritarian or pluralist approach (reforms that may create an electorate more representative of 
the state’s population). Flavin (2015) proposes that elites have fewer tools to influence state 
legislators or state legislative elections when their fund-giving abilities are restricted, and so 
more restrictive campaign finance law should cause state policy to become more redistributive to 
reflect the preferences of the general population (a relationship reflected in his analysis). I begin 
by replicating this previous study of campaign finance legislation, using a newly available 
dataset through the Campaign Finance Institute and expanding upon the analysis of that paper by 
exploring the distinction between PAC and individual contribution limits.  
Additionally, I draw on data from an annual publication of the Council of State 
Governments to examine the possibility that the presence of “inclusive” electoral institutions 
designed to increase the ease of voting––specifically, the closing date for registration and no-
excuse absentee voting––is associated with higher levels of redistributive spending.1 This is a 
 
1 I use “inclusive institutions” in a sense that is reminiscent of Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), in that they are 
institutions designed (implicitly, at least) to increase the number of citizens involved in political decision-making. 
Another appropriate approach might be to define the institution by its effect––inclusion of more citizens in the 
electorate, or at least the easing of restrictions on inclusion. 
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relationship that has been implicitly and explicitly hypothesized to exist, but to my knowledge 
has not yet been empirically tested. Franko, Kelly, and Witko (2016) suggest, based on their 
finding that the income composition of the electorate is associated with economic policy 
liberalism, that “reformers may be better served investing resources in fending off attacks on the 
right to vote and launching campaigns to expand access to the voting booth…[since] expanding 
the participation of lower-income voters produces important changes in government, public 
policy, and ultimately ‘who gets what’” (p. 364). Leighley and Nagler (2014) summarize the 
conclusions of their study by observing that “voters are significantly more conservative than 
non-voters on redistributive issues,” and so offer in conclusion that “we expect that public 
policies regarding redistribution and inequality will be less generous than they would be in the 
case of universal turnout” (p. 183, 188). I examine this hypothesis by analyzing the effects of 
policies designed to increase voter turnout on the redistributive expenditures of state 
governments. Finally, I follow by exploring whether or not those policies (closing date for 
registration and absentee voting) are actually associated with changes in the income composition 
of the electorate.  
 
Literature 
Inequality and the Unequal Responsiveness of Government 
There is a clear consensus that income inequality is on the rise in the United States, a 
trend that began in the 1970s and has been primarily driven by the top decile (and smaller) of the 
population. Rising levels of inequality in the United States––the share of pre-tax national income 
of the top 1% of earners in the US has doubled since 1970, whereas that of the bottom 50% has 
nearly halved––have drawn increasing attention to the role that economic inequality might 
 
  7 
potentially play in the political arena (Piketty & Saez 2014; Alvaredo et al. 2013; World 
Inequality Database; see Appendix for visualizations). Picketty and Saez (2014) review trends in 
income and wealth inequality in the United States and Europe over the 20th century, noting that 
the steady decrease in inequality after the 1930s was followed by a sharp reversal in recent years. 
Since the 1970s, the United States has comfortably outpaced Europe in term of the top decile’s 
share of total income and net wealth. Alvaredo et al. (2013) focus on an even smaller fraction of 
“the top,” examining the political and economic shifts that have contributed to the growth of 
income share of the highest 1% of earners in the United States and Europe. They identify four 
key factors that have contributed to this development, many of which have political 
underpinnings (a conclusion shared by Huber et al., 2017): declining top marginal tax rates, 
changes to the bargaining power of labor, growth in private and inherited wealth (more so in 
Europe than the US), and the increased correlation between high labor and high capital earnings 
(i.e. dividends, interest, rent). For political scientists, this notable increase in income inequality 
in the United States over the past 40 years has sparked a renewed interest in the role that wealth 
plays in political representation and responsiveness. 
 On the heels of this growing interest, several studies in the mid-2000s identified that 
policy outcomes appeared to be driven predominantly by the preferences of higher-income 
groups; however, some recent studies have questioned that conclusion. Using public opinion 
data, Gilens (2005) assesses the extent to which the preferences of wealthy vs. non-wealthy 
constituents’ interests are represented in Congress. Using 1,781 survey questions administered 
between 1981 and 2002, he examines the probability of a policy being enacted via logistic 
regression conditional on the percent of an income group that favors the policy. When the 
preferences of income percentiles diverge, the preferences of the top 90th percentile are 
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drastically overrepresented in comparison to both 50th and 10th percentiles (e.g., in the case of 
50th percentile, moving from “strongly oppose” to “strongly support” increases the probability of 
a policy being enacted by 6%, as opposed to 30% for the 90th). Gilens and Page (2014) revamp 
this study in an attempt to distinguish between different forms of democratic responsiveness: 
majoritarian (the will of the average citizen drives policymaking), economic elite domination 
(powerful, well-resourced individuals), majoritarian pluralist (Madisonian factions and interest 
groups), and biased pluralism (interest groups that predominantly represent the wealthy). They 
approach the same survey data, but incorporate information about the relative support for each 
policy by large interest groups. They note that while it is true that the “average citizen” gets her 
way about two-thirds of the time, a multivariate analysis of the probability of policy enactment 
within four years suggests that the real causal forces at play are the policy preferences of the 90th 
percentile of income or stances of interest groups. On that basis, they conclude that elite-
dominated and bias pluralism models of democratic governance have more empirical credibility 
than pure majoritarian democracy.  
In light of this information, various studies have sought to better understand the 
mechanisms underlying these relationships. Using data from the Cooperative Congressional 
Election Study, Flavin and Franko (2019) develop a measure of economic segregation at zip 
code level and conclude that a small but substantive impact of economic segregation exists on 
policy responsiveness. Specifically, they encounter a notable congruence between House of 
Representatives legislator vote and the CCES stated policy preference of members of the district: 
more concentratedly affluent zip codes are “better represented” than their heterogeneous or 
poorer counterparts.2 Additionally, the authors identify that politicians are more likely to contact 
 
2 The authors construct a measure of an “insulation index” that is log transformed such that higher 
positive values indicate a more concentrated affluent zip code, zero represents a perfectly even split 
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(and receive a donation from) residents of wealthier areas, even independent of the residents’ 
own income. Bonica et al. (2013) examine a variety of political factors that they view as 
contributing to the inability of democracy to slow (an implicitly non-democratic) increase in 
income inequality in the United States. In addition to an increased ideological acceptance of free-
market capitalism, rising real incomes that have decreased support for social programs, and 
distortionary institutions (with respect to the majority) such as gerrymandering and the filibuster, 
they identify two factors of serious interest with respect to electoral institutions: (1) the ability of 
the rich to influence politics through campaigns, lobbying, and “revolving door” bureaucrats and 
(2) low turnout among lower-income sections of the population that has skewed the distribution 
of voters towards wealthier Americans. They explicitly note that the latter may be due to “legal 
and administrative measures that make it relatively costly for the poor to vote” (p. 104).  
However, not all studies are quite so conclusive about the extent to which policy 
exclusively reflects the will of the American elite. Brunner et al. (2013) exploit the fact that 
legislators must vote publicly on ballot provisions in California before they go to a vote by the 
general public to examine the congruence/marginal vote of California voters and legislators in 
seventy-seven ballot provisions over time, breaking down each district into income terciles to use 
as the unit of analysis. Instead of a clear demonstration of the sway of higher income voters, the 
authors find that Democratic state legislators tended to vote more (79% vs. 74% of the time) with 
their lower income constituents, whereas Republicans voted ever so slightly more with higher 
income constituents. Brunner and coauthors conclude that partisanship and ideology are the real 
factors at play, rather than legislators who pay more heed to their wealthier constituents. 
Reexamining Gilens’ work discussed above, Peter Enns (2015) identifies a common 
 
between highest and lowest income quintiles, and more negative values represent increasingly 
concentrated less affluent areas.  
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misconception in the interpretation of his results––that when the rich “win,” the middle class 
“loses.” In fact, using Gilens’ own data, he suggests that, rather, “coincidental representation” is 
the norm: if both groups favor the same set of two policies, but a higher income constituency 
more so or the middle class is indifferent to one of the two, a quantitative analysis would (as 
Gilens’ does)  show that the higher income group is driving policy––even though the preferences 
of both are being represented.  
The lack of uniformity in the literature both encourages some caution when making 
assumptions in theory building and presents an opportunity to make further contributions to an 
ongoing unresolved question. Through an examination of an area of policy where (in the 
aggregate) upper and lower/middle income groups in society have different preferences, this 
study can help to reveal whether inclusive/exclusive electoral institutions, which would 
disproportionately affect one group vs. the other’s sway on candidate selection and politician 
incentives, have any role in the eventual policy direction of the state––and therefore, examine the 
extent to which this uneven influence is at play in politics as usual. 
 
Redistributive Preferences 
 The key to this study, then, is the selection an area of policy where the groups 
disproportionately affected by different electoral institutions have consistently diverging 
preferences. Wealthier individuals have an obvious “objective” economic interest in less 
redistributive policy—but do they actually differ substantially from their median-income 
counterparts in public opinion? Ballard-Rosa et al. (2016) examine the structure of American 
income tax policy preferences using a choice-based survey experiment where participants 
selected various potential tax policies according to their preferred outcome. The authors find 
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that, in general, Americans favor more progressive tax structures––consistent with previous 
research by the likes of Norton and Ariely (2011). However, they add to the previous literature 
by examining the extent to which a variety of demographic/personal factors influence the 
elasticity of these preferences. Relevant to this study, they do find evidence of economic self-
interest, and note that lower elasticities for taxing the lowest income groups among individuals 
earning $175,000 or higher may suggest a measure of regressive income tax preferences. Rather 
than approaching the question with individual-level survey data, Brunner et al. (2011) develop a 
predicted employment index on the basis of the mix of industries represented in census tracts in 
California and then examine the impact of positive shocks to labor demand on voting returns on 
ballot propositions at the tract level. They find that support for redistribution falls significantly in 
tracts that have experienced these positive, plausibly exogenous economic shocks, and conclude 
that positive economic conditions lead to more conservative voting behavior on redistributive 
issues. Interestingly, they also find a smaller but reliable effect for ballot proposition votes on 
non-redistributive issues and gubernatorial votes, noting the importance of “cognitive 
consistency” in voting behavior (2011, p. 898). 
Other studies have taken a more qualitative, survey-based approach that zeroes in on the 
wealthiest percentiles of American society. Page et al. (2013) conduct 104 interviews with 
wealthy (median wealth of $7,500,000) Chicago-area residents. While they acknowledge the 
potential challenges of a small and geographically limited sample, they note that their wealthy 
interviewees hold notably more conservative views on a variety of issues––social welfare 
spending, job programs, taxation, and government regulation––than public opinion data from the 
general public. In a study that serves both to confirm this line of reasoning and offer additional 
nuance, Broockman et al (2019) capitalize on their close proximity to Silicon Valley by 
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conducting a survey of technology entrepreneurs, political donors, and self-identified wealthy 
individuals in the general public (the majority of all three groups of survey participants have a 
net worth over $1,000,000). While they do note that millionaires in the mass public and 
Republican donors score lower on redistributive liberalism than the general public, Democratic 
donors behave like more extreme Democrats. And, most unique to their study, tech entrepreneurs 
represent an interesting mix of quasi-libertarian preferences on government regulation, but near 
average preferences on redistributive liberalism. In general, they suggest approaching the 
preferences of wealthy individuals in the US with a grain of salt because of this heterogeneity. 
Finally, recent polling data offers another window into the extent to which economic elites’ 
objective self-interest in more regressive policy is translated into actual stated preferences. While 
Democratic public opinion is solidly consistent around a potential increase to a $15 federal 
minimum wage, Republican public opinion is relatively split by income ($75K+: 34%; < $40K: 
56%). It appears that this partisan divide is one of the factors driving the overall observed public 
split on income––61% favorable to 74% favorable using the same income cutoffs (Pew, 2019).  
 Given that income groups differ in their redistributive preferences, and there is an 
ongoing debate over the extent to which those groups have uneven sway on the direction of 
policy, it is worth addressing how this uneven influence would be exerted, if it were to be. Two 
plausible options are (1) through the selection of candidates and (2) potential influence over 
those candidates once they are in office. It is worth noting that (2) does not necessarily imply 
corrupt behavior; it may simply be that wealthier individuals are more likely to contact their 
representatives, take time off to sit in legislative sessions, hire lobbyists, or otherwise “make 
some [entirely legal] noise,” as suggested by the results of Flavin and Franko (2019) above. It 
could, of course, be more “distasteful” quid-pro-quo behavior—large conditional donations, etc.–
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–however, that variety of interaction likely is not the norm. To an extent, election law provides 
some moderating element over both of the these options by potentially decreasing the influence 
of the less redistribution-inclined top (through disclosure requirements or limits for campaign 
donations, for example) and increasing turnout of voters on the margin who are more likely to 
represent the “median” voter (through “get out the vote” reforms).  
There is consistent empirical evidence that the US voting population and general US 
population are different in measurable ways. Franko, Kelly, and Witko (2016) develop a measure 
of electoral class bias, the overrepresentation of affluent voters as compared to the general voting 
age population for a given election. In general, non-voters are less affluent and more favorable 
towards liberal (this in the American sense of “liberal,” not the classical or European use of the 
term) redistributive policy (Franko et al 2016). The authors demonstrate that the economic policy 
liberalism of a given state is influenced by the public opinion of the state, moderated by their 
measure of electoral class bias. In situations of high ECB, the positive and statistically significant 
relationship between public opinion and government composition/policy disappears. Their paper 
underscores one of the primary motivations for studying election law––changes in the 
composition of the electorate can have notable effects on policy outcomes. The results presented 
by Avery (2015) concur, though with a slightly different measure of (lagged) income bias and 
using the Gini coefficient as a dependent variable in a first-difference general error correction 
model. Leighley and Nagler (2013), in their reexamination of the classic Who Votes? (Wolfinger 
and Rosenstone, 1980), study over three decades of turnout data in an attempt to better 
understand the composition of the American electorate and the institutions that drive increased 
participation. While they confirm what are now canonical statements about the electorate––that 
turnout increases with education, income, and age, even conditional on a set of demographic 
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characteristics––their self-proclaimed “most important empirical finding” is that voters are 
significantly more conservative than non-voters on redistributive issues, even if they may be 
more liberal on social issues (p. 183). Specifically, when asked to rate support on a seven-point 
scale for the government to ensure a health insurance plan, the provision of services, and jobs 
(questions which Leighley and Nagler determine to be redistributive in nature), voters are on 
average around 0.4 points more conservative than non-voters in every presidential election since 
1972 except 1984.3 Bearing this data in mind, I turn to redistributive policy as my dependent 
variable in the analyses of this paper.  
 
Redistributive Policy in Perspective 
 Due to its political, economic, and social consequences, the causes and ramifications of 
redistributive policy have been well investigated by social scientists of all varieties. Though the 
body of literature surrounding this topic is immense, there are several key insights from work in 
the United States and other federal democracies that serve as an important foundation for the 
analyses that follow. There is solid theoretical and empirical grounding throughout American 
and comparative politics that government redistribution is linked to left-leaning governments 
(Kelly and Witko, 2012; Huber and Stephens, 2012 and 2014; Nicholson-Crotty et al., 2006; 
though not without controversy, e.g., Leigh, 2008). This is, of course, to be expected given the 
policy positions generally held by left parties. Additional evidence suggests that union strength is 
positively associated with policy liberalism (Radcliff and Saiz, 1998) and levels of inequality 
(Kelly and Witko, 2012; Huber and Stephens, 2014; Western and Rosenfeld, 2011). And, of 
course, redistributive expenditures should be associated with need (Huber and Stephens 2014, 
 
3 Questions are drawn from the American National Election Studies (ANES) 
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e.g.). Of note, in a subnational federal context, analyses of redistributive spending in states must 
account for the differing roles and fiscal responsibilities of state and federal governments. One 
common approach has been to examine the subnational penetration of federal social programs, as 
with the four Brazilian and Argentinian programs studied by Niedzwiecki (2019). Another 
approach, and the one that this study takes, is to distinguish between expenditures on programs 
controlled entirely by the federal government and discretionary state expenditures.  
 
Electoral Institutions 
 While not immense, there has been at least some literature examining the effect of state 
campaign finance regulations on different political outcomes. Flavin’s 2015 study of the effects 
of campaign finance on welfare spending is the most clearly relevant to this project. Using a 6-
point additive index for campaign finance regulation, he finds a positive association between 
increased campaign finance regulation and redistributive spending, which he suggests is due to 
smaller campaign contributions from wealthy individuals and business interests. Milyo (2012), 
from whose data Flavin draws his 6-point index, uses items (2) through (4) on Flavin’s scale (see 
footnote) to estimate a difference-in-difference model for the effect of campaign finance on trust 
in state government and finds primarily statistically insignificant results. 4 Hamm & Hogan 
(2008), using their own historical dataset, measure the impact of the extent of campaign 
contribution limits (a five-point additive index) and availability of public financing (a 
dichotomous variable) on the probability of a major party challenge to the incumbent in 25 US 
 
4 Originally, I had intended to utilize Flavin and Milyo’s data to develop an earlier version of this study. However, 
some conversations with the Campaign Finance Institute led me to a dataset that I believe to be more detailed than 
that available to those authors. Our respective measures of campaign finance stringency correlate at 0.78 for the 
years in which they overlap. The six dummies that constitute Flavin’s scale are (1) mandatory disclosure of 
campaign contributions, (2) limits on corporation/union contributions to state candidates, (3) limits on individual 
contributions, (4) public financing for governor’s races, (5) public financing for state legislative races, (6) “clean 
elections” that do not allow outside funds other than public financing. 
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states for 1994-1998 general and primary elections. They conclude from their analysis that, 
controlling for district level characteristics (competitiveness, heterogeneity) and system level 
characteristics (legislative professionalization, term limits), with time fixed effects, public 
financing negatively affect chances of major primary challenge, but both public financing and 
contribution limits positively and independently impact general election major and minor 
challenges. 
 There are notable and confirmed trends with respect to the effects of early voting, same 
day registration, and absentee voting on turnout. Burden et al. (2014), in their examination of US 
counties in the 2004 and 2008 elections, use both individual level data from the US Census 
Bureau’s Current Population Survey and county-level returns to estimate the impacts of Early 
Voting and Same-Day (and Election-Day) Registration reforms. Their results suggest, somewhat 
counterintuitively, that Early Voting decreases turnout, perhaps by muting the level of 
excitement and social responsibility associated with Election Day; however, Same-Day 
Registration has a positive effect that attenuates that effect and, ceteris paribus, increases voter 
turnout. Larocca and Klemanski (2011) conduct a very similar study, only using individual level, 
self-reported data from the CPS, and incorporating no-excuse absentee voting (a policy in which 
absentee ballots may be requested without an explicit reason). The results of their logistic 
regression model suggest that no-excuse absentee voting and EDR are associated with a higher 
probability of turnout, whereas early voting has the opposite effect. Leighley and Nagler (2013), 
using a slightly different model specification, concur. However, their examination suggests this 
effect is present primarily for the second and third income quintiles, rather than the lowest. On a 
slightly different policy note, Sebastian Garmann (2017) exploits a reduction in polling hours in 
the German state of Saarland to estimate a difference in difference model of the effect on voter 
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turnout. He estimates that 3 additional hours of polling time are “worth” a 2% increase in voter 
turnout (p < 0.01).  
 Of note, academic literature does not reflect the popular consciousness’s concern with 
Voter Identification Laws. Most studies have not found statistically significant decreases in voter 
turnout, and of those that have, only a few identify an ethnic or income component to the 
declining turnout. Burden et al (2014), among others, find no statistically significant relationship; 
Hood and Bullock (2012) study the changes in turnout in Georgia between 2004-2008 and 
conclude that the turnout decrease due to the Voter ID policy was around 0.4% — however, they 
are unable to identify any larger effect for any ethnic groups. Grimmer et al (2018) revisit the 
conclusions of an earlier paper by Hajnal et al (2017) that did find significant effects, and upon 
implementing error-correcting measures and revising statements made about a difference in 
difference estimator, find no systematic relationship between Voter ID laws and turnout of any 
ethnic group. Additionally, they highlight the difficulties of using a survey like the CCES to 
accurately measure variation in turnout for any policy.  
 Because changes in election law have the potential to alter voter turnout (and therefore 
the composition of the electorate) and the influence of particularly powerful players, this study 
proposes that variation in electoral institutions, through its effect of the composition and 
incentives of the state legislature, will be associated with variation in redistributive expenditures 
of US states (and if my causal inference is good, cause variation in redistributive expenditures). 
Specifically, on the basis of the literature I propose the following three hypotheses:  
• Hypothesis 1 (Replication Hypothesis): More stringent campaign finance law, as 
measured by a modification of Flavin’s index described above (2015), should be 
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associated with a larger proportion of the state budget allocated towards “Public 
Welfare” (redistributive spending). 
• Hypothesis 2: Closing dates for voter registration closer to election day and the presence 
of no-excuse absentee voting should be associated with higher “Public Welfare” 
expenditures. 
• Hypothesis 3: Closing dates for voter registration closer to election day and the presence 
of no-excuse absentee voting should be associated with lower levels of electoral income 
bias.  
This paper will contribute both to the ongoing debate over the role of affluence in American 
politics, through elucidating one of its potential mechanisms and moderators, and to the general 
institutional literature on elections by demonstrating its potential (or lack of) policy implications. 
 
Methodology and Data Sources 
Model 
I utilize a quantitative design using data from the fifty US states over approximately the 
past 40 years (since 1976). The reasons for this time bound are both theoretical and practical. 
State voting laws were overhauled in the years following the 1965 Voting Rights Act, and the 
highly racialized dynamics of voting in the South in the 1960s and years prior make any case 
much earlier than 1970 theoretically complicated. Additionally, the Supreme Court case Buckley 
vs. Valeo (1976), which declared unconstitutional the limits on campaign expenditures 
introduced in Section 608 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (though it upheld limits 
on contributions to campaigns), notably altered the landscape of election law. Perhaps for this 
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reason (and herein lies the practical limitation), the datasets at my disposal don’t include 
campaign finance law information prior to 1976.  
 With time series data in hand, this study employs a linear regression-based approach to 
model the effect of election law on policy outcomes, estimating a fixed effects model of the form 
𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡 =  𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑖 𝑡−1 𝛽 + 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 𝑡−1𝜃 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
where 𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡 is the dependent variable of interest (i.e., the proportion of a state budget spent on a 
certain budget item or the electoral class bias in a given year),  𝐿𝑎𝑤𝑖 𝑡−1 is an election law in 
each state-year (an index of contribution limits, public financing, and disclosure requirements; or 
the presence or absence of no-excuse absentee voting/election day registration; or the number of 
days prior to election day that voter registration closes), 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 𝑡−1 is a lagged K × 1 vector 
of control variables at the state level, 𝛼𝑖 is a state fixed effect, and 𝛾𝑡  is a year fixed effect. The 
inclusion of fixed effects in the model control for time varying trends (e.g. federal government 
action that affect all states, or general increases in redistributive expenditures) and constant 
unobserved state effects (e.g. to the extent that California’s “political DNA” is different from 
Alabama’s and is unchanging over time).  
Redistributive Spending 
 There are, of course, a variety of ways to operationalize the redistributive policy 
orientation of a state government. Previous studies have used state welfare expenditures, cash 
assistance program spread, top marginal income tax rates and corporate tax rates, minimum wage 
requirements, and actual levels of redistribution such as pre- and post-transfer Gini indexes 
(Kelly and Witko 2012; Leigh 2008; Niedzwiecki 2018; Flavin 2015; etc.). For this study, I 
choose public welfare expenditures. First and foremost, it allows continuity with the previous 
literature on electoral institutions (e.g. Flavin, 2015; Husted and Kenny, 1997). Additionally, the 
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determination of its redistributive nature and separation from federal expenditures has already 
been made by the U.S. Census Bureau, which compiles the Historical Finances of State 
Governments archive on the basis of annual data from the states themselves.5 Finally, welfare 
expenditures represent a more proximate outcome of the policymaking process than actual levels 
of poverty or income inequality, and express more year-to-year variation than changes to the 
minimum wage or to tax rates. This greater variation and political relevance offer a more 
targeted opportunity to examine the mechanism in question. I divide by total state expenditures 
in order to account for the difference in the size of state budgets, to adjust for inflation, and to 
ensure continuity with Flavin (2015), leaving a proportion (scaled from 0 to 100) as the final 
result. I could, alternatively, have used per capita expenditures––however, those dollar amounts 
would have been nominal, not real, and sensitive to sudden changes in population. 
Independent Variables 
I draw data on campaign finance legislation from the Campaign Finance Institute’s (CFI) 
historical database of state laws. Compiled over the last several years and released in 2019, the 
dataset includes information on a substantial number of campaign finance reforms, including 
dollar-level contribution limits from PACs, unions, individuals, corporations, and other donors. 
The data collection ranges from 1996-2018, but was designed to match up and expand upon a 
previously compiled dataset by Keith Hamm and Robert Hogan that stretches back to 1976, with 
a similar, though more restricted, volume of information. Unfortunately, in its current state the 
 
5 Expenditures include (but are not limited to): “Cash payments made directly to individuals contingent upon their 
need, other than those under Federal categorical assistance programs… Provision, construction, and maintenance of 
nursing homes and welfare institutions owned and operated by a government for the benefit of veterans or needy 
persons (contingent upon their financial or medical need)…Public employment for all public welfare activities and 
expenditures for welfare activities not classified elsewhere” (U.S. Census Bureau). 
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Hamm and Hogan dataset contains only data from 1976, 1984, and 1990-2008.6 In order to 
ensure a balanced panel with no gaps in timing, I only use data from 1989 forward for the 
models involving campaign finance below.  
I combine manual data compilation from the Council of State Government’s annual 
publication The Book of the States and existing datasets through Michigan State University’s 
Correlates of State Policy Project to develop panel data for a variety of electoral/registration 
reforms.7 The Book of the States has changed in its election law data collection over time, and in 
recent years has included information on a variety of reforms such as automatic and online 
registration, vote-by-mail, voter identification laws, polling hours, and same-day registration 
(paired with early voting data). For my analysis, I select two reforms for which I have data from 
1976 to the present, and which are not recent innovations (e.g. online registration)––the number 
of days prior to election day that registration is required in order to vote, and the presence of a 
reform known as no-excuse absentee voting (in which, quite literally phrased, citizens do not 
need to present any form of excuse for requesting an absentee ballot). Visualizations of the 
variation in these and other dependent and independent variables are available in the appendix. It 
would appear that sufficient variation over time is present to warrant a panel data approach.  
Controls 
I include a variety of controls for political climate, union density, and unemployment in 
the regressions below. On the basis of the literature presented above, I expect that more left-
leaning state governments, higher percentages of the population associated with unions, and 
 
6 Both datasets report data every two years, in the election year. Under the theory that legislators are “single-minded 
seekers of reelection” (Mayhew 1974), I use campaign finance legislation for the upcoming election, rather than the 
previous, to impute the missing years. 
7 I owe a note of thanks to Kelsey Sutton and Scott Hallyburton, who joined me one evening to complete the last 
final of data transcription and coding over dinner. 
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higher unemployment rates should be associated with higher redistributive expenditures. I draw 
unemployment data from the St. Louis Federal Reserve, measures of citizen and government 
liberalism from Berry et al. (1998), union density from the database maintained by Hersh et al 
(2001), and the Ranney index and the variables underlying its calculation (e.g. percent of 
Democrats in the state House and Senate, gubernatorial election competition, as presented by 
Klerner (2013)) from Michigan State University’s Correlates of State Policy Project.8 These 
different data sets often have different time bounds, restricting my analysis from its original 
1976-2018 intent. I present summary statistics for these and other variables in the appendix.  
 As stated previously, I begin my analysis by replicating Flavin’s 2015 study on the 
influence of campaign finance law on state expenditures. I have attempted in the following 
section to develop a model as close as possible to the one that he specifies. The logic of this 
replication is that a negative result would indicate cause for more theoretical caution when 
investigating other institutions of interest, while a positive result while using slightly different 
data lends more credence to the relationship he claims exists.   
The initial task in developing a replication of Flavin’s study is to recreate the additive 
index he uses to measure the stringency of campaign finance regulations. The six dummies that 
 
8 Of important note: I use a set of revamped measures of citizen and government liberalism, originally described in 
Berry et al (1998) and updated methodologically in Berry et al. (2013). I utilize these throughout my discussion of 
campaign finance in order to best match the models used by Flavin (2015) and because of their frequent use in the 
political science literature. However, due to some concern about the theoretical underpinnings of the citizen 
liberalism measure, I drop that variable for several models thereafter. Berry et al. measure government liberalism as 
a weighted average of the ideological position of each party’s state house and senate delegation, and the governor. 
For recent, extended time series data, Berry et al. use the mean NOMINATE scores for each state’s congressional 
delegation as a proxy for these actors (and NPAT data for state actors where available, but only for 1995-2008). 
Citizen liberalism is based on ideological ratings of the state congressional delegation by the Americans for 
Democratic Action and AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education. Specifically, citizen ideology in a given district 
is measured as the ideology score of the incumbent candidate and their (sometimes hypothetical) challenger 
(challenger scores estimated as the average ideology score for incumbents of the same party in that state), weighted 
by their estimated support in the electorate. Because of the numerous assumptions entailed in reaching this final 
number (ideology of challenger; that ADA and COPE scores reflect that district’s perception of candidate ideology; 
etc.), I express more concern about the theoretical validity of this measure as opposed to Berry et al.’s measure of 
government liberalism. 
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constitute Flavin’s scale are (1) mandatory disclosure of campaign contributions, (2) limits on 
corporation/union contributions to state candidates, (3) limits on individual contributions, (4) 
public financing for governor’s races, (5) public financing for state legislative races, and (6) 
“clean elections” that do not allow outside funds other than public financing. The CFI data gives 
easy access to items 1-5, with a little bit more head scratching necessary to pull together item 6. 
Hamm and Hogan’s dataset provides items 1-3, a combined measure of public financing (4 and 
5) and a dummy for clean elections (6). I code a 4-item measure of Flavin’s scale, incorporating 
items 1-3 and a dummy for public financing of any kind, which correlates with his measure at 
0.78.  As mentioned previously, while the Hamm and Hogan dataset does span the years 1976-
2008, it does so because it includes the years 1976, 1984, and 1990-2008. In the interest of a 
balanced panel sample with no uneven year gaps, I only utilize data from 1989 onwards in the 
model estimations that follow.  
A Note on Conceptual Distinction 
An immediate consideration in this variety of institution-based research question is the 
causality/endogeneity concern that these independent variables are simply measuring some 
underlying characteristic of a state’s political climate. That is, that more left-leaning states are 
inclined to be more redistributive, as well as have electoral institutions that would limit 
campaign donations or expand the franchise, and so these variables simply represent different 
facets of the same feature or trait of US states. In the following table (Table 1), I provide some 
suggestive evidence that these two concepts––the electoral institutions in place and left 
government––are distinct. Of course, we would not expect no correlation even if the theory laid 
out above concerning redistributive expenditures were true: after all, the election of left-party 
politicians is one mechanism by which an electorate might push its government towards more 
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redistributive policy. However, as shown below, electoral institutions and political climate are 
not particularly tightly correlated, with a maximum magnitude of 0.19 for the Pearson correlation 
coefficient of campaign finance law and variables describing political climate and 0.24 for 
registration date.9 Even then, the direction of correlation in the latter case would suggest that 
more restrictive registration dates were associated with more, not less, left-leaning governments. 
And, additionally of note, my constructed campaign finance index and the closing date for 
registration are not well correlated with each other at all (0.006), indicating that we may be 
empirically justified in independently examining these two sets of institutions. 
 













Campaign Finance 1 0.006 0.191 -0.0003 -0.157 -0.119 
Registration Date 0.006 1 0.255 0.142 0.002 0.069 
% Dems. 0.191 0.255 1 0.352 0.135 -0.086 
Gov. Vote Share -0.0003 0.142 0.352 1 0.160 -0.048 
Gov’t Liberalism -0.157 0.002 0.135 0.160 1 0.436 
Citizen Liberalism -0.119 0.069 -0.086 -0.048 0.436 1 
 
Note: Correlations presented are pairwise complete observations using Pearson’s correlation coefficient. 





 The following pages present and discuss the results of a series of regressions designed to 
test the hypotheses above regarding the relationships between electoral institutions and 
redistributive policy. I restate those hypotheses here:  
 
9 I do not present the point-biserial correlations or other binary-continuous measures of correlation for the presence 
of no-excuse absentee voting with these variables, as all others in the table are continuous. Its maximum point-
biserial correlation with measures of political climate is -0.19 (with the proportion of Democrats in the state 
legislature). 
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• Hypothesis 1 (Replication Hypothesis): More stringent campaign finance law, as 
measured by a modification of Flavin’s index described above (2015), should be 
associated with a larger proportion of the state budget allocated towards “Public 
Welfare” (redistributive spending). 
• Hypothesis 2: Closing dates for voter registration closer to election day and the presence 
of no-excuse absentee voting should be associated with higher “Public Welfare” 
expenditures. 
• Hypothesis 3: Closing dates for voter registration closer to election day and the presence 




 Extensive note has been made in the political science literature of the uneven influence of 
wealthy individuals on the American political process (e.g. Bonica et al (2013); Gilens (2005); 
Gilens & Page (2014); though not without controversy –– consider, for example, Brunner (2013) 
in the literature review above). Attention has been given in particular to policy areas in which the 
well-resourced and the less so possess different expressed preferences or aims, as well as to the 
institutional levers that mitigate or exacerbate differential legislative or policy response. Patrick 
Flavin’s 2015 study of campaign finance regulation takes one such approach. As an initial step in 
my analysis of electoral institutions in this thesis, I replicate the results of Flavin’s paper using a 
more recent and detailed dataset produced by the Campaign Finance Institute. For reference, 
Flavin’s primary results table is shown below.   
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Figure 1.  Primary Results Table of Flavin (2015) 
 
 
 The results presented in Table 2a are––with the exception of models that include time 
effects––supportive of the conclusions of Flavin (2015). This is a serious exception, as a large 
part of the causal credibility of Flavin’s claim derives from the assumption that his results are 
independent of general time trends across all states in redistributive expenditures. If we are 
willing to relax that assuredness, that a similarly constructed but distinct index over an 
overlapping but expanded time period shows analogous substantive effects to Flavin’s study 
would lend additional credibility to the result that there is a positive association between stricter 
campaign finance legislation and redistributive spending, operationalized as the proportion of 
state spending devoted to “Public Welfare” in each state-year. Regardless, some notable 
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differences remain between the two sets of models. First, due to a discrepancy in the Hamm & 
Hogan dataset, my information on campaign finance legislation begins in 1989, rather than 1976, 
though it does extend to 2018 (the model date range is a byproduct of data availability for other 
covariates). As indicated, perhaps in part due to a corresponding lack of variation in the primary 
independent variable (fewer overall observations, and a four-point rather than six-point scale), 
models which include time effects do not produce statistically significant relationships between 
campaign finance and public welfare spending.10 Additionally, due to data availability/validity 
concerns I do not report regressions that include demographic information about the racial 
composition of each state-year, and I use the two-party vote share of the previous Democratic 
candidate for governor instead of the presence of a Democratic governor and a measure of state 
party competition. However, the difference in R2 values between our respective analyses 
suggests that these changes in model specification represent a substantial decrease in explanatory 
power. Of note, in models (3) and (4) I drop the measure of governor vote share in an attempt to 
increase the date range of the balanced panel (as I only have data for that measure through 2010), 








10 Of note: In these models, as in all others unless specifically noted, I report heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent (clustered) standard errors. Specifically, I use the estimators suggested by McKinnon and White (1985) as 
a smaller-sample alternative from the original White (1980) estimator, computed by the R package sandwich (and 
hereafter referred to) as “HC1” clustered standard errors (Zeileis 2004). 
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Table 2a.  Replication of Flavin (Table 1) - Public Welfare 
 Dependent variable: 
 Public Welfare 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Campaign Finance Index t-1 0.613** 0.054 0.656** 0.021 
 (0.218) (0.235) (0.233) (0.229) 
Citizen Liberalism t-1 0.049** 0.013 0.024 -0.014 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.023) 
Government Liberalism t-1 -0.011 -0.001 -0.023 -0.0004 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) 
% Democrats in House t-1 -7.426*** -2.409 -7.041** -0.979 
 (2.070) (2.222) (2.243) (2.128) 
Two-Party Gov. Vote t-1 1.755 1.860   
 (1.398) (1.338)   
Mean Unemployment t-1 0.307*** 0.305* 0.232*** 0.283* 
 (0.062) (0.129) (0.060) (0.137) 
Union Density t-1 -0.542*** 0.046 -0.788*** -0.076 
 (0.068) (0.105) (0.082) (0.086) 
State/Year Effects? Yes/No Yes/Yes Yes/No Yes/Yes 
Year Range: 1989-2010 1989-2010 1989-2016 1989-2016 
Observations 1,056 1,056 1,344 1,344 
Adjusted R2 0.254 -0.044 0.360 -0.043 
F Statistic 58.974*** 4.344*** 134.699*** 4.039*** 
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
 
 In keeping with Flavin’s approach, I also report effects for Cash Assistance expenditures 
(a subset of Public Welfare, as determined by the U.S. Census Historical State Finances records, 
and hypothesized by Flavin to follow the same trend), as well and Parks and Recreation funding, 
a portion of the state budget presumed to be less controversial or polarized among income 
groups. In neither of these cases do I encounter significant effects of campaign finance 
stringency, a contrast to Flavin in the former case and a concurrence in the latter. The 
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implications of these results will be discussed further in the paper. I will note that the models in 
both of these tables reflect the anticipated importance of the unemployment rate on welfare 
expenditures––that is, it would appear that welfare expenditures are primarily driven by need, 
rather than political factors. This is heartening information.  
 
Table 2b.  Replication of Flavin (Table 1) - Cash Assistance, Parks and Recreation 
 Dependent variable: 
 Cash Assistance Parks and Recreation 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Campaign Finance Index t-1 -0.050 0.049 -0.001 -0.0004 
 (0.075) (0.075) (0.013) (0.014) 
Citizen Liberalism t-1 -0.021*** -0.013 -0.002 0.002 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) 
Government Liberalism t-1 0.014* 0.011 0.003* 0.003* 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) 
% Democrats in House t-1 1.887** 0.618 0.136 0.141 
 (0.609) (0.799) (0.193) (0.201) 
Two-Party Gov. Vote t-1 -0.296 -0.256 0.071 0.106 
 (0.437) (0.410) (0.118) (0.116) 
Mean Unemployment t-1 0.211*** 0.130** -0.020*** -0.007 
 (0.033) (0.049) (0.005) (0.010) 
Union Density t-1 0.163*** 0.005 0.017* 0.002 
 (0.038) (0.042) (0.007) (0.009) 
State/Year Effects? Yes/No Yes/Yes Yes/No Yes/Yes 
Year Range: 1989-2008 1989-2008 1989-2010 1989-2010 
Observations 912 912 1,056 1,056 
Adjusted R2 0.384 -0.027 0.022 -0.048 
F Statistic 88.998*** 6.820*** 11.055*** 3.743*** 
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 In addition, I then take advantage of the more detailed data at my disposal to investigate a 
distinction in the causal driver of the relationship observed in Flavin’s results and the models in 
Table 2a regarding welfare expenditures. Tables 3 and 4 repeat the regressions presented in 
Table 2a, replacing the modified version of Flavin’s campaign finance index with more granular 
variables: the dollar amount of limits on campaign contributions to candidates for state 
house/assembly from individuals (in Table 3 as I.L.) and PACs (in Table 4 as PAC L.). In 
following with the original coding scheme of Hamm and Hogan (2008), I operationalize 
unlimited campaign donations as a donation limit of $1,000,000. However, as evidenced by the 
coefficients on individual limits (I.L.) in Table 3, the radically different orders of magnitude of 
this combination of independent variable (0-1,000,000) and dependent variable (0-100 in theory, 
0-38.8 in practice) lead to coefficients that are statistically significant but substantively so small 
that they are difficult to interpret. As such, I rescale campaign contributions to range from 0 to 1, 
with a value of 1 indicating unlimited donations (expressed as “I.L. (R)”). Of course, that this 
effect predominantly represents the difference between a limit and no limit is essentially by 
design due to Hamm and Hogan’s numeric operationalization of limitless donations. In a fixed 
effects model that controls for unobserved, state constant characteristics, the dollar amount of 
campaign contributions permitted is significant at p < 0.05 independent of a variety of controls 
for political and economic climate. The substantive effect indicates a shift from no individual 
donations permitted to unlimited donations should be associated with an approximately 1.7 
percentage point drop in the proportion of the state budget devoted to welfare expenditures. 
However, adding additional controls for the time trend across states results in a loss of statistical 
significance (and a fair bit of explanatory power for the model in general). 
 
 




Table 3.  Individual Contribution Limits and Public Welfare 
 Dependent variable: 
 Public Welfare 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
I.L. t-1 -0.000*  -0.000  -0.000*  -0.000  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
I.L. (R) t-1  -1.693*  -0.536  -1.691*  -0.535 
  (0.765)  (0.777)  (0.753)  (0.751) 
Cit. Lib. t-1 0.051** 0.051** 0.013 0.013 0.026 0.026 -0.015 -0.015 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022) 
Gov’t Lib t-1 -0.010 -0.010 -0.001 -0.001 -0.023 -0.023 -0.0004 -0.0004 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) 
% Dems. t-1 -6.935*** -6.935*** -2.425 -2.425 -6.606** -6.606** -1.053 -1.053 
 (2.062) (2.062) (2.218) (2.218) (2.168) (2.168) (2.101) (2.101) 
Gov. Vote t-1 1.748 1.748 1.926 1.926     
 (1.421) (1.421) (1.325) (1.325)     
Unemp. t-1 0.316*** 0.316*** 0.300* 0.300* 0.239*** 0.239*** 0.274* 0.274* 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.130) (0.130) (0.060) (0.060) (0.138) (0.138) 
Unions t-1 -0.520*** -0.520*** 0.044 0.044 -0.768*** -0.768*** -0.080 -0.080 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.104) (0.104) (0.080) (0.080) (0.086) (0.086) 
State/Year 
Effects? 


















Observations 1,056 1,056 1,056 1,056 1,344 1,344 1,344 1,344 
Adjusted R2 0.256 0.256 -0.041 -0.041 0.360 0.360 -0.041 -0.041 
F Statistic 59.540*** 59.540*** 4.731*** 4.731*** 134.887*** 134.887*** 4.560*** 4.560*** 








Table 4.  PAC Contribution Limits and Public Welfare 
 Dependent variable: 
 Public Welfare 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
PAC L. t-1 -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
PAC L. (R) t-1  -1.093  -0.245  -1.247  -0.325 
  (0.715)  (0.632)  (0.718)  (0.651) 
Cit. Lib. t-1 0.051** 0.051** 0.013 0.013 0.025 0.025 -0.015 -0.015 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.023) 
Gov’t Lib. t-1 -0.012 -0.012 -0.001 -0.001 -0.024 -0.024 -0.0003 -0.0003 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
% Dems. t-1 -7.142*** -7.142*** -2.415 -2.415 -6.779** -6.779** -1.054 -1.054 
 (2.072) (2.072) (2.204) (2.204) (2.216) (2.216) (2.102) (2.102) 
Gov. Vote t-1 1.626 1.626 1.878 1.878     
 (1.421) (1.421) (1.334) (1.334)     
Unemp. t-1 0.310*** 0.310*** 0.302* 0.302* 0.235*** 0.235*** 0.276* 0.276* 
 (0.062) (0.062) (0.130) (0.130) (0.060) (0.060) (0.138) (0.138) 
Unions t-1 -0.532*** -0.532*** 0.048 0.048 -0.777*** -0.777*** -0.076 -0.076 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.103) (0.103) (0.081) (0.081) (0.085) (0.085) 
State/Year 
Effects? 


















Observations 1,056 1,056 1,056 1,056 1,344 1,344 1,344 1,344 
Adjusted R2 0.249 0.249 -0.044 -0.044 0.357 0.357 -0.042 -0.042 
F Statistic 57.574*** 57.574*** 4.429*** 4.429*** 132.936*** 132.936*** 4.274*** 4.274*** 
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Table 4 repeats the same analysis, but with limits on PAC campaign contributions. 
Contrary to the results of an analysis of individual contribution limits, in no model specification 
presented do limits on PAC contributions independently influence public welfare expenditures. 
This analysis suggests that, to the extent that campaign finance stringency influences 
redistributive expenditures as modeled by Flavin (2015), the portion of the effect driven by 
contribution limits is more likely due to limits on individual, not PAC, expenditures. I hold 
further elaboration on this point (including time effects) until the discussion later in this paper.  
 
Mass-Based Approach 
 The next set of regressions are the result of an investigation of a causal pathway that has 
been implicitly suggested by the literature (e.g. Bonica et al., 2013; Leighley and Nagler, 2013) 
but to my knowledge has not yet been empirically tested: that more inclusive electoral 
institutions––reforms that make it easier, rather than harder, to vote––are (causally) associated to 
a more redistributive orientation of state policy. The presumed causal pathway usually goes as 
follows: if there were to be an exogenous change in electoral institutions in a state that opened up 
the voting process to more individuals, the composition of the electorate would change to be 
more representative of the state as a whole. Given that non-voting individuals, on average, have 
different policy preferences than voting individuals, legislators should respond to changes in the 
electorate accordingly––for example, by increasing the amount of redistributive spending by the 
state.  
 Table 5 examines one such policy: the registration date for voting. Registration Date is 
an integer-valued variable that marks the number of days prior to election day that state residents 
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must register in order to vote, ranging from 0 (in other words, election day registration) to 50 
(Arizona up until the early 1990’s). Coding decisions for this variable are discussed above, in the 
discussion of data and methodology, and in a more detailed coding supplement. Model (1) 
suggests that moving the closing registration date two weeks closer to election day would be 
associated with around a percentage point increase in the proportion of the budget devoted to 
public welfare (-0.08 * -14 = 1.12), though this effect disappears with time effects. However, 
once standard errors are adjusted to reflect serial correlation in the data, there is no evidence to 
suggest that the coefficient on registration date is statistically different from zero.11 These model 
specifications include a battery of controls for left party control, party competition, union 
strength, and the unemployment rate, as well as state and time effects. As an added measure, I 
also report the same results using a dummy variable to indicate the presence or absence of 
election day registration in Table 6 (i.e., Registration Date of 0), and drop two controls in models 
(5) and (6) of Table 5. I remove citizen liberalism out of hesitation about the measure’s validity 
(see footnote in methodology section) and the two-party vote share of the previous Democratic 
candidate for governor in order to increase the number of years of data available. Again, within 







11 To that end, I’ll offer the following haiku, courtesy of Keisuke Hirano and via Angrist and Pischke (2009):  
 
T-stat looks too good 
Try clustered standard errors–– 
Significance gone. 
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Table 5.  Closing Date for Registration 
 Dependent variable: 
 Public Welfare 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Registration Date t-1 -0.086*** -0.017 -0.086 -0.017 -0.115 -0.005 
 (0.018) (0.014) (0.073) (0.050) (0.061) (0.043) 
Citizen Liberalism t-1 0.069*** 0.035*** 0.069** 0.035   
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.022) (0.025)   
Government Liberalism t-1 -0.026** -0.005 -0.026 -0.005 -0.035 -0.006 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
% Democrats in House t-1 -10.903*** -4.063*** -10.903*** -4.063* -11.074*** -3.084 
 (0.910) (0.793) (2.237) (1.971) (2.138) (1.829) 
Two-Party Gov. Vote t-1 1.719* 2.943*** 1.719 2.943***   
 (0.740) (0.582) (1.091) (0.878)   
Mean Unemployment t-1 -0.024 0.119* -0.024 0.119 0.013 0.108 
 (0.045) (0.055) (0.083) (0.126) (0.081) (0.132) 
Union Density t-1 -0.526*** 0.041 -0.526*** 0.041 -0.631*** 0.022 
 (0.023) (0.034) (0.055) (0.113) (0.065) (0.112) 
State/Year Effects? Yes/No Yes/Yes Yes/No Yes/Yes Yes/No Yes/Yes 
Year Range 1976-2010 1976-2010 1976-2010 1976-2010 1976-2016 1976-2016 
Standard Errors - - HC1 HC1 HC1 HC1 
Observations 1,680 1,680 1,680 1,680 1,968 1,968 
Adjusted R2 0.472 -0.016 0.472 -0.016 0.530 -0.033 
F Statistic 222.499*** 8.874*** 222.499*** 8.874*** 453.379*** 5.842*** 
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Table 6.  Election Day Registration 
 Dependent variable: 
 Public Welfare 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EDR t-1 -0.242 -0.754 1.067 -0.741 
 (1.484) (1.064) (1.375) (0.908) 
Government Liberalism t-1 -0.025 -0.002 -0.040* -0.006 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) 
% Democrats in House t-1 -9.949*** -3.717 -10.145*** -2.839 
 (2.450) (2.112) (2.152) (1.873) 
Two-Party Gov. Vote t-1 1.406 2.824**   
 (1.110) (0.876)   
Mean Unemployment t-1 -0.017 0.114 0.031 0.105 
 (0.084) (0.127) (0.083) (0.132) 
Union Density t-1 -0.593*** 0.063 -0.657*** 0.027 
 (0.055) (0.115) (0.062) (0.114) 
State/Year Effects? Yes/No Yes/Yes Yes/No Yes/Yes 
Year Range 1976-2010 1976-2010 1976-2016 1976-2016 
Observations 1,680 1,680 1,968 1,968 
Adjusted R2 0.452 -0.021 0.518 -0.030 
F Statistic 239.829*** 8.865*** 433.075*** 6.817*** 
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
 
In Table 7, I examine another reform hypothesized to increase voter turnout: no excuse 
absentee voting. Initially, there appears to be a positive and statistically significant effect of this 
binary variable on the order of a 2.7 percentage point increase in public welfare spending. This 
effect is robust to an increased year range after I drop a limiting control in models (3) and (4). 
However, upon the inclusion of time effects, no-excuse absentee voting loses its explanatory 
power. It would appear from that approach that the effects that models (1) and (3) are actually 
picking up are related instead to general trends across all states over time, such as increased 
public welfare expenditures (see figure in appendix). 
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Table 7.  No Excuse Absentee Voting (Binary) 
 Dependent variable: 
 Public Welfare 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
No Excuse Absentee t-1 2.768** 0.359 2.267** -0.086 
 (0.899) (0.714) (0.818) (0.618) 
Government Liberalism t-1 -0.019 -0.002 -0.036 -0.007 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) 
% Democrats in House t-1 -8.928*** -3.844 -9.451*** -3.001 
 (2.383) (2.054) (2.136) (1.829) 
Two-Party Gov. Vote t-1 1.405 2.835**   
 (1.101) (0.867)   
Mean Unemployment t-1 -0.013 0.113 0.019 0.110 
 (0.082) (0.126) (0.081) (0.131) 
Union Density t-1 -0.531*** 0.053 -0.603*** 0.024 
 (0.055) (0.110) (0.063) (0.110) 
State/Year Effects? Yes/No Yes/Yes Yes/No Yes/Yes 
Year Range 1976-2010 1976-2010 1976-2016 1976-2016 
Observations 1,680 1,680 1,968 1,968 
Adjusted R2 0.485 -0.021 0.537 -0.033 
F Statistic 271.896*** 8.631*** 466.173*** 5.851*** 
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Causal Mechanism: Electoral Class Bias 
 In the pages that follow I draw on Franko et al.’s measure of “Electoral Class Bias” to 
investigate further the presumed causal relationship––that is, that these policy changes might 
occur because they are associated with changes in the composition of the electorate.12 As 
described above (and further in the appendix), this CPS and regression-generated measure can be 
thought of as the difference in probability of voting of the lowest and highest income groups in 
each state. As stated by the authors, “A value of 0.33 (the average of the measure across all years 
and states), for example, indicates that the rich are 33% more likely to vote than the poor” 
(Franko et al. (2016), Appendix A). This relationship offers an opportunity to better understand 
whether the “mass-based” effects (and lack thereof) presented above are due to a lack of change 
in the electorate or some other set of factors. 
 In Tables 8 and 9, I present results of a within state effects OLS regression using a lagged 
independent variable for the effect of the closing date for registration and no-excuse absentee 
voting on electoral class bias. I lag the independent variable for both one and two time periods to 
allow for the possibility that a change in law takes time to be reflected in changes in the 
electorate. Of note, in no regression specification does the election policy have a significant 
effect on the composition of the electorate once controlling for income per capita, 
unemployment, and union participation. Of note, in both cases it would appear that increased 
unemployment significantly drives up the levels of income bias in the electorate. 
 
 
12 I want to especially thank Prof. Nathan Kelly, who generously provided me access to this measure, developed for 
Franko, W. W., Kelly, N. J., & Witko, C. (2016). Class Bias in Voter Turnout, Representation, and Income 
Inequality. Perspectives on Politics, 14(2), 351–368. Dr. Kelly was also kind enough to offer feedback on the 
proposal for this honors thesis nearly a year ago, and offered suggestions that have been integral to my thinking.  
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Table 8.  Registration Date and Electoral Class Bias 
 Dependent variable: 
 Electoral Class Bias 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Registration Date t-1 -0.107  -0.030  
 (0.059)  (0.052)  
Registration Date t-2  -0.108  -0.044 
  (0.057)  (0.055) 
Income per Capita t-1   -0.0003 -0.0003 
   (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Mean Unemployment t-1   0.869*** 0.879*** 
   (0.202) (0.200) 
Union Density t-1   -0.060 -0.068 
   (0.140) (0.142) 
State/Year Effects? Yes/No Yes/No Yes/Yes Yes/Yes 
Year Range 1976-2006 1976-2006 1976-2006 1976-2006 
Observations 1,470 1,421 1,470 1,421 
Adjusted R2 -0.028 -0.029 -0.025 -0.026 
F Statistic 8.822** 8.683** 11.298*** 11.062*** 























Table 9.  Absentee Voting and Electoral Class Bias 
 Dependent variable: 
 Electoral Class Bias 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
No Excuse Absentee t-1 1.122  0.754  
 (1.053)  (1.017)  
No Excuse Absentee t-2  0.943  0.620 
  (1.048)  (1.037) 
Income per Capita t-1   -0.0002 -0.0002 
   (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Mean Unemployment t-1   0.876*** 0.878*** 
   (0.206) (0.206) 
Union Density t-1   -0.073 -0.070 
   (0.139) (0.139) 
State/Year Effects? Yes/No Yes/No Yes/Yes Yes/Yes 
Year Range 1976-2006 1976-2006 1976-2006 1976-2006 
Observations 1,519 1,519 1,470 1,470 
Adjusted R2 -0.052 -0.053 -0.025 -0.025 
F Statistic 3.360 2.274 11.461*** 11.332*** 





 This paper began with three primary hypotheses: that a new dataset would validate the 
conclusion that more restrictive campaign finance law is associated with higher public welfare 
expenditures; that turnout-driving reforms such as later registration or no-excuse absentee voting 
would similarly be positively associated with public welfare; and that the latter two reforms 
would decrease the income bias of the voting population. Concisely put, I find evidence to 
support the first two hypotheses only under model specifications that do not include time effects, 
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and am unable to reject the null hypothesis that these reforms have no influence on the 
composition of the electorate. However, once time effects are included, I cannot conclusively 
make statements about either the relationship Flavin (2015) observes or that predicted by the 
literature on voter and non-voter preferences. 
 The theoretical framework set up over the course of this paper suggests that these 
relationships are causal––states with later registration dates have higher redistributive 
expenditures, all else equal, because those later registration dates in some way alter legislator’s 
incentives. And while various model decisions have been made in such a way as to facilitate that 
understanding––lagging the independent variable and employing a within-effects panel data 
approach, for example––the claim of causality is not as clear-cut as it might be were an 
exogenous shock (such as, say, a court case) to be the driver of this analysis. Certainly, the 
evidence that these reforms may not alter the composition of the electorate in a meaningful way 
suggests that a careful reconsideration of that mechanism may be in order. Additionally, the 
knowledge that controlling for time trends across all states removes the significance of the 
hypothesized relationship should be a cause of serious doubt. Below, I offer a few interpretations 
of the results presented above, revisit the conclusions of the literature in light of this information, 
and touch on the policy implications of this work.  
 The lack of a crystal-clear picture across all model specifications allows some room for 
various interpretations of the regressions above, and so I offer two: one based on models that do 
not include time effects, and one based on a more complete model specification that does. At the 
very least, barring the inclusion of time effects, it would appear that more stringent campaign 
finance law and no-excuse absentee voting are associated with higher public welfare 
expenditures. Suppose we were to take as a given that there is some causal credibility to the 
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relationship viewed through within state fixed and random effects.13 Even if this were the case,  
we would still need to reconsider the statement that this latter relationship is due to changes in 
the composition of the electorate, at least on an income dimension, in light of the information 
presented in Tables 8 and 9. Are there still mechanisms by which these institutions might affect 
legislator behavior if not by directly altering the electorate, and consequently, who sat in state 
office? In short, perhaps. One could feasibly imagine that legislators might not only be 
responsive to votes at the ballot box, but also to perceptions of who might vote, in particular 
when the exact income composition of the electorate is not clear (i.e., when the best information 
we can rely on are exit polls and CPS/ANES estimates). Additionally, if the knowledge that 
election day registration is possible were to encourage increased political participation outside of 
voting from previously less-active populations, we might encounter a similar effect.  
 However, the knowledge that these effects are not robust to the inclusion of time effects 
should give us serious pause in this line of thinking. In the models above, I do not find any 
political variables that are consistently associated with public welfare expenditures in U.S. states. 
This is a surprising finding, for several reasons. First, it would appear to cast doubt on the causal 
assurance offered by the models presented in Flavin (2015) that demonstrate a relationship 
between campaign finance stringency and public welfare expenditures. Our estimation strategies 
are not wildly divergent: while the time periods covered are different, they represent only a 
minimal difference in time frame (27 years vs. 32 years); for the years in which they overlap, a 
four-point and six-point campaign finance index correlate at nearly 0.8; and both use standard 
error adjustments common in applications of cross-sectional time series data (MacKinnon and 
 
13 Model coefficients and significance with fixed effects are quite similar to a random effects specification. 
However, I am skeptical in this case of the first random effects assumption, that is, that 𝔼[𝛼𝑖|𝑋𝑖] = 0, and so I do 
not present those results. 
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White heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent “clustered” standard errors, and Beck 
and Katz panel corrected standard errors). Additionally, while findings with state effects support 
statements that suggest reforms such as no-excuse absentee voting would increase redistributive 
expenditures, the lack of findings with time effects and inability to demonstrate the proposed 
mechanism call into question the empirical backing for those claims.  
 Why might this be the case? Two insights from Rigby and Springer (2011) may help to 
guide discussion. The authors examine the effects of five electoral reforms––mail-in registration, 
motor voter (registration at the DMV/MVA), election day registration, no excuse absentee 
voting, and early voting––on the income bias of registration rolls and of the electorate (CPS 
data). Of note for this study, they distinguish between three kinds of electoral reforms: those that 
improve the ease of registration, those that eliminate the registration process all-together, and 
those that make voting more convenient. Additionally, they find that motor-voter laws and 
election day registration decrease electoral income bias when registration rolls were highly 
unequal prior to the reform, and that early voting had a net positive increase on income bias in 
situations of prior high registration bias. This interaction effect suggests that, when these 
institutional changes do have a visible effect, they do because the environment is particularly 
conducive to the kind of change in behavior they would elicit. That is, if the closing date for 
registration were to alter the electorate (or, as mentioned above, perceptions of the electorate), it 
might be more likely to do so when the electorate was already highly unrepresentative of the 
general population and there was more room for a substantial change due to the reform. 
Additionally, if it were to be shown that no-excuse absentee voting (which increases the ease of 
voting, rather than ease of registration) increased income bias of the electorate, then we might be 
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less likely to expect to see changes in redistributive policy, despite increases in turnout. Future 
studies with access to registration data (or estimates thereof) might take such an approach. 
 This study examined the effects of two varieties of electoral institutions on a polarizing 
expenditure category. Turnout-increasing institutions such as absentee voting and later 
registration dates have been hypothesized to alter the balance of power between high-income and 
low-income citizens by shifting the composition of the electorate, while others have suggested 
campaign finance law tips the scales by decreasing the influence of the economic elite. In my 
analysis, I do not encounter substantive causal evidence that either of these institutions alter the 
policy outcomes of U.S. states. These findings encourage caution in making conjectures about 
the implications of changes in election law for the policy-making process. On the basis of this 
evidence, I conclude that while there are numerous reasons to expand the franchise, not the least 
of them normative, expectations that these changes would lead to different policy outcomes 
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Appendix: 
 
Electoral Class Bias 
 
The following description of the construction of the Electoral Class Bias measure used in this 
paper is an excerpt from Appendix A of Franko, W. W., Kelly, N. J., & Witko, C. (2016). Class 
Bias in Voter Turnout, Representation, and Income Inequality. Perspectives on Politics, 14(2), 
351–368. Again, I want to extend serious thanks to Prof. Nathan Kelly for allowing me to access 
this data.  
 
“We draw on the Current Population Survey (CPS) Voter Supplements to construct our 
measure of electoral class bias (Brown et al. 1999; Hill and Leighley 1992; Rigby and 
Springer 2011; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993)…The CPS interviews thousands of individuals in 
every state allowing for representative estimation of turnout rates in each state, even in those 
states with small populations. [And], questions about voting have been consistently asked for 
each presidential and midterm election for several decades… 
Our measure captures disproportionate participation rates across income groups (Blakely 
et al. 2001; Mackenbach and Kunst 1997; Wichowsky 2012), providing an empirical measure of 
how much richer citizens participate in elections relative to others within their state. The class 
bias variable is created by first assigning all CPS respondents to a cumulative, within-state 
family income distribution. For instance, consider a CPS respondent who reports a family 
income of $50,000 to $59,999. If this income category consists of 10% of the state’s residents 
and 50% of the population falls below this income level, then this individual is assigned to 0.55 
on the state’s cumulative income distribution (0.50 + [0.10/2]). This within state income position 
is then used as a determinant of voter turnout in the following OLS regression model:  
vote = b0 + b1(income position) + e, 
where vote is coded as 1 if the individual reported voting and 0 if the person did not vote, 
and income position indicates each individual’s position on their state’s cumulative income 
distribution as described above. A unique regression model is specified for each state and each 
election year. Since both variables (vote and income) are bounded between 0 and 1, the resulting 
coefficient (b1) on the cumulative income scale is interpreted as the absolute difference in the 
probability of voting for the poorest and richest income group in each state… 
…Hence, the participation bias measure ranges from -1 to 1, with negative values 
indicating low-income individuals are more likely to vote than the rich, 0 meaning the rich and 
poor have an equal probability of voting, and positive values meaning the rich vote at a higher 




















Figure A1: Growth of Top 1% Income Share in the United States  
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Figure A2: Smoothed Changes in Employment and Hourly Wages, 1980-2005 
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Figure A3.  DV: Electoral Class Bias 
 
Figure A4.  DV: Public Welfare 
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Gov’t Liberalism 1 0.090 0.159 0.102 0.067 
% Dems. 0.090 1 0.334 0.261 0.181 
Gov. Vote Share 0.159 0.334 1 0.180 0.103 
Unemployment 0.102 0.261 0.180 1 0.292 
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Table A2.  Descriptive Statistics 
 
 N Mean St. Dev. Min Max Year Range 
 
Public Welfare 1,450 21.82 5.27 6.68 38.78 1970 - 2017 
Cash Assistance 1,000 1.58 1.13 0.00 6.63 1970 - 2008 
Parks and Recreation 1,450 0.44 0.30 0.04 4.00 1970 - 2017 
ECB Index 1,550 34.01 7.67 10.77 67.74 1976 - 2006 
Campaign Finance Index 1,450 2.65 1.10 0 4 1989 - 2017 
Individual Limits 1,450 290,198.70 452,654.60 0 1,000,000 1989 - 2017 
Individual Limits (Rescaled) 1,450 0.29 0.45 0 1 1989 - 2017 
PAC Limits 1,450 340,257.70 472,248.90 0 1,000,000 1989 - 2017 
PAC Limits (Rescaled) 1,450 0.34 0.47 0 1 1989 - 2017 
Registration Date 1,450 21.15 10.83 0 50 1976 - 2017 
Election Day Registration 1,450 0.13 0.34 0 1 1976 - 2017 
No-Excuse Absentee 1,450 0.43 0.49 0 1 1970 - 2017 
Citizen Liberalism 1,372 50.11 15.32 8.45 97.00 1970 - 2016 
Government Liberalism 1,421 47.40 14.64 17.51 73.62 1970 - 2017 
% Dems. in House 1,372 0.52 0.17 0.13 0.93 1970 - 2016 
Dem. Governor Vote Share 1,078 0.49 0.11 0.11 0.82 1970 - 2010 
Unemployment Rate (Mean) 1,450 5.56 1.82 2.30 13.61 1976 - 2017 
Union Density 1,450 12.24 5.88 2 30 1971 - 2017 
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